. The cave and the mine each contained 40,000-100,000 Rousettus aegyptiacus bats (Egyptian fruit bats).
Longitudinal investigations of the outbreaks at both locations were initiated by the Viral Special Pathogens Branch of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA, and Entebbe, Uganda) in collaboration with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI). During these studies, genetically diverse MARVs and RAVVs were isolated directly from bat tissues, and infection levels of the 2 viruses were found to increase in juvenile bats on a predictable bi-annual basis (4, 5) . However, investigations at Kitaka Mine were stopped when the miners exterminated the bat colony by restricting egress from the cave with papyrus reed barriers and then entangling the bats in fishing nets draped over the exits. The trapping continued for weeks, and the entrances were then sealed with sticks and plastic. These depopulation efforts were documented by researchers from UVRI, the CDC, the National Institute of Communicable Diseases (Sandringham, South Africa), and UWA during site visits to Kitaka Mine (online Technical Appendix Figure, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/ EID/article/20/8/14-0696-Techapp1. pdf). In August 2008, thousands of dead bats were found piled in the forest, and by November 2008, there was no evidence of bats living in the mine; whether 100% extermination was achieved is unknown. CDC, UVRI, and UWA recommended against extermination, believing that any results would be temporary and that such efforts could exacerbate the problem if bat exclusion methods were not complete and permanent (6, 7) .
In October 2012, the most recent known marburgvirus outbreak was detected in Ibanda, a town in southwest Uganda. Ibanda is ≈20 km from the Kitaka Mine and is the urban center that serves smaller communities in the Kitaka area. This MHF outbreak was the largest in Ugandan history: 15 laboratory-confirmed cases occurred (8) . In November 2012, an ecologic investigation of the greater Ibanda/ Kitaka area was initiated. The investigation included interviews with local authorities to locate all known R. aegyptiacus colonies in the area. Although minor colonies of small insectivorous bats were found, the only identifiable colony of R. aegyptiacus bats was found inside the re-opened Kitaka Mine, albeit at much reduced size, perhaps 1%-5% of that found before depopulation efforts.
To determine whether the R. aegyptiacus bats that had repopulated Kitaka Mine were actively infected with marburgviruses, we tested 400 bats by using previously described methods (4, 5 (4, 9) . The reason for the increase is not clear, but it may be related to the effects of the extermination and subsequent repopulation. Increases in disease prevalence in wildlife populations after culling are not unprecedented (6, 7) . We speculate that after the depopulation attempt, a pool of susceptible bats became established over time and was subjected to multiple marburgvirus introductions, as evidenced by the genetic diversity of viruses isolated from the bats (Figure) . A pool of susceptible bats would have led to higher levels of active infection within the colony, thereby increasing the potential for virus spillover into the human population. A significant sex and age bias was not detected with respect to active infection during the breeding season (Fisher exact test, p>0.5 for both), and overall, the presence of virus-specific IgG among the bats was 16.5%, a finding consistent with that in previous studies (4, 5) .
Phylogenetic analysis of viral RNA genome fragment sequences in this study showed high marburgvirus genetic diversity, including the presence of RAVVs and MARVs. Sequences for isolates from 3 bats were nearly identical to those of the MARV isolates obtained from patients in the 2012 Ibanda outbreak (8) , suggesting that bats from Kitaka Mine were a likely source of the virus. Phylogeny of concatenated marburgvirus nucleoprotein (NP) and viral protein 35 (VP35) gene fragments as determined by using the maximumlikelihood method. Sequences from the NP (289-372 nt) and VP35 (203-213 nt) genes were amplified and determined from viral RNA and then sequenced as described elsewhere (4) . Sequence names in boldface represent those generated from samples collected from bats during the November 2012 outbreak investigation at Kitaka Mine, Uganda. Underlined sequence names represent those generated from samples obtained from marburgvirus-infected persons in Kabale and Ibanda, Uganda, in 2012. Multiple sequence alignments were generated, and a maximum-likelihood analysis was conducted on concatenated NP and VP35 (208-580 nt) sequences by using the PhyML method in conjunction with the GTR+I+G nucleotide substitution model implemented in SeaView version 4.2.12 (10). NP and VP35 gene sequences determined from samples in this study (in boldface) were submitted to GenBank (accession nos. KJ747211-KJ747234 and KJ747235-KJ747253, respectively). Bayesian posterior probabilities above 50 are shown at the nodes. Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site. Ang, Angola; DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo; Gab, Gabon; Ger, Germany; Ken, Kenya; Net, Netherlands; Rav, Ravn virus; Uga, Uganda; Zim, Zimbabwe.
Detection of Measles Virus Genotype B3, India
To the Editor: Molecular epidemiologic investigations and virologic surveillance contribute notably to the control and prevention of measles (1) . Nearly half of measles-related deaths worldwide occur in India, yet virologic surveillance data are incomplete for many regions of the country (2,3) . Previous studies have documented the presence of measles virus genotypes D4, D7, and D8 in India, and genotypes D5, D9, D11, H1, and G3 have been detected in neighboring countries (3, 4) .
Kerala, India's southernmost state, has high measles vaccination coverage compared with many other states in the country; however, the disease is still endemic in the region. Two districts, Thiruvananthapuram and Malappuram, report the highest numbers of cases (5) . Baseline data on circulating measles virus genotypes are needed for measles elimination, but such data are not available for Kerala. In this context, we performed a pilot genetic analysis of the measles virus strains circulating in Thiruvananthapuram, the capital of Kerala. We used throat and nasopharyngeal swab and serum samples from children admitted to Sree Avittom Thirunal Hospital during measles outbreaks occurring March-August 2012.
We used the Vero/human-SLAM cell line (http://www.phe-culture collections.org.uk). for isolation of measles virus from throat and nasopharyngeal swab samples. For serologic confirmation of cases, we used a commercial measles IgM ELISA kit (IBL International GmbH, Hamburg, Germany). Virus genotyping was based on the 450-nt coding sequence for the carboxyl terminus of nucleoprotein (N) of measles virus, as recommended by the World Health  Organization (3,6) . We extracted RNA from the samples using TRIzol reagent (GIBCO-BRL, Grand Island, NY, USA). We performed reverse transcription PCR using a SuperScript One-Step RT-PCR kit with a Platinum Taq system (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) and previously described primers (3, 6) . Amplicons were subjected to bidirectional sequencing using a BigDye Terminator v3.1 cycle sequencing kit (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). We edited and aligned nucleotide sequences using Bio Edit 7.1.11 software (7). Phylogenetic analysis was performed by using the maximumlikelihood method implemented in the MEGA5 program (8) to compare the determined N gene sequences with the World Health Organization reference sequences of the 24 known measles genotypes.
PCR products could be amplified from 16 of the 24 samples analyzed. Ten samples provided high quality sequence reads for the N gene coding region, which were used for further analysis. Clinical and demographic data for these 10 cases, virus isolation status, and GenBank accession numbers of the sequences are summarized in the Table. Phylogenetic analysis revealed 1 of the 10 measles virus strains to be of genotype D8 (online Technical Appendix Figure 1 , http://wwwnc. cdc.gov/EID/article/20/10/13-0742-Techapp1.pdf), a genotype previously found to be circulating in Kerala and in other regions of India (3, 6, 9, 10) . The other 9 virus strains were closely related to B3 genotype reference strains, indicating circulation of the B3 genotype in Kerala (online Technical Appendix Figure  1) . The nucleotide sequences of 7 of the 9 strains were identical, indicating a single chain of transmission. The remaining 2 samples showed sequence divergence, indicating independent sources of infection. In a phylogenetic analysis comparing the Kerala B3 genotypes and a dataset of
